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Abstract 
Globalization threatens “good jobs at good wages”, according to overwhelming 
public sentiment. Yet professional discussion often rules out such concerns a 
priori. We instead offer a framework to interpret and address these concerns. We 
develop a model in which monopolistically competitive firms pay efficiency 
wages, and these firms differ in both their technical capability and their monitoring 
ability. Heterogeneity in the ability of firms to monitor effort leads to different 
wages for identical workers – good jobs and bad jobs – as well as equilibrium 
unemployment. Wage heterogeneity combines with differences in technical 
capability to generate an equilibrium size distribution of firms. As in Melitz 
(2003), trade liberalization increases aggregate efficiency through a firm selection 
effect. This efficiency-enhancing selection effect, however, puts pressure on many 
“good jobs”, in the sense that the high-wage jobs at any level of technical 
capability are the least likely to survive trade liberalization. In a central case, trade 
raises the average real wage but leads to a loss of many “good jobs” and to a 
steady-state increase in unemployment.  
 
 
The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the 
position of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System. Donald Davis 
gratefully acknowledges support of the National Science Foundation. We are grateful for 
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I. Introduction 
 Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson, Jr., speaking in March 2007, cited a Pew Research 
Center survey to the effect that “more and more Americans seem to doubt that trade brings 
greater benefits than costs.” While the public in the survey was roughly evenly split on the 
overall benefits of freer trade, among those stating an opinion there was an overwhelming 
sentiment that trade costs jobs and lowers wages.1  
 A central concept in public discussions of globalization is that of a “good job”, a job that 
pays a high wage, offers generous benefits, and provides job security. Such jobs are the subject 
of envy for those in lesser jobs, and induce a feeling of good fortune in those who have them. In 
economists’ terms, good jobs have an element of rent that bad jobs lack. The benchmark model 
of labor demand used in most general equilibrium trade models has no place for such a concept: 
workers are paid their marginal product.  Trade models typically explain changes in wages in 
response to liberalization as the consequence of endogenous changes in marginal products.  
These models rule out a priori any discussion of good and bad jobs. 
 Our view is that trade economists are missing an opportunity to address public concerns, 
and adequately understand public attitudes, by neglecting models where trade liberalization 
might affect the incidence of labor market rents. In this paper, we offer such an analysis by 
combining the efficiency wage model of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) with the trade model of 
Melitz (2003). The Shapiro-Stiglitz model explains labor market rents and unemployment as 
arising from asymmetric information: firms monitor their workers’ effort imperfectly, and in 
equilibrium use high wages to induce workers to value their jobs sufficiently that the workers 
won’t risk being fired for shirking. The Melitz framework features equilibrium product market 
rents, and the distribution of these rents is affected by trade liberalization.  
 In our combined model, firms differ in both their ability to monitor workers and in their 
underlying productivity, and the interaction of these two forms of heterogeneity implies novel, 
                                                 
1 Remarks by Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson, Jr. before the Economic Club of Washington, March 1, 2007; 
“Free Trade Agreements Get a Mixed Review,” December 19, 2006, Pew Research Center For the People and Press. 
Lest it be thought that the perspective on job and wage losses is a partisan Democratic view, it is notable that 
Republicans also responded that freer trade costs jobs and lowers wages respectively by margins of three- and four-
to-one. 
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and provocative, possibilities for adjustment to trade liberalization. Heterogeneity in monitoring 
costs implies different wages for ex ante identical workers, leading to a precise and intuitive 
definition of good jobs as those that pay above the economy wide average wage. As in Melitz 
(2003), trade liberalization in our model has a powerful efficiency-enhancing selection effect, 
with the lowest marginal cost firms expanding and less productive firms contracting or exiting. 
Unlike in Melitz, where all jobs pay the same and all workers benefit from liberalization, trade 
liberalization in our model has dramatically different effects on the welfare of individual 
workers. In a move from autarky to free trade, and controlling for firm productivity, trade 
destroys only good jobs. The number of bad jobs expands and this occurs most sharply for the 
worst jobs. Under the same experiment, efficiency is enhanced and the typical price falls. These 
are not conflicting effects; they are actually alternative descriptions of the same phenomenon.  
 The model also suggests there are likely to be aggregate employment effects arising from 
within-industry re-allocation. While not mandated by the model, there are good empirical 
reasons to believe that the net effect of liberalization will be to raise the average wage relative to 
the lowest wage in the economy. This occurs through selection effects that leave the relative 
wage offered by any individual firm unchanged. If trade does raise this average wage, though, it 
also tightens the incentive constraints on shirking. In the new steady state, the higher average 
wage makes job loss less daunting, and equilibrium unemployment must be higher to insure 
effort.  
 The second best nature of our model implies that aggregate income gains from 
liberalization are not certain, although they likely remain a central case. Trade in our model has a 
strong tendency to increase variety, lower prices, and shift production toward more efficient 
firms. However it also has a strong tendency to threaten what workers consider “good jobs” and 
could contribute to a rise in structural unemployment.  
 There are two recent papers that also consider unemployment and job loss in a Melitz-
type model of heterogeneous firms. Egger and Kreickemeier (2006) integrate Melitz (2003) with 
the fair wage model of Akerlof and Yellen (1990). Firm-level wages in their model are a 
weighted average of firm productivity and an unemployment-adjusted average wage. 
Unemployment arises because the fair wage constraint prevents wages from fully adjusting to 
insure full employment. While trade liberalization may cost jobs in their model, it does so only at 
the least productive firms offering the lowest wages. Hence their model does not offer a sense in 
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which trade may threaten good jobs at good wages. Janiak (2006) integrates Melitz (2003) with a 
Pissarides (2000) large firm search model to show that trade integration raises equilibrium 
unemployment. However, this specific result, and even the existence and uniqueness of 
equilibrium in Janiak’s model, require implausible restrictions on the substitutability of products, 
so that equilibrium markups must be bounded below by 100 percent. 
 An earlier literature, including Copeland (1989), Brecher (1992) and Hoon (2001) 
considers the implications of efficiency wages in trade models. None of these papers considers 
the channels we consider in the current paper, and in particular they rule out the sort of intra-
industry reallocations that seem to be important in practice and that are the focus of Melitz 
(2003). The paper by Matusz (1996), which analyzes efficiency wages in a Krugman-style model 
of intraindustry trade, is the most relevant to our project, and we discuss Matusz’ model further 
below. 
 Section II of our paper lays out our labor market model of efficiency wages when 
monitoring costs differ across firms. This labor market is merged with the Melitz (2003) model 
of heterogeneous firms in Section III and IV. Our results about the effects of trade liberalization 
on wages, jobs, unemployment, and economy-wide efficiency are presented in Section V and VI. 
 
II. Unemployment, Efficiency Wages, and the Firm 
 A. Shapiro-Stiglitz with Heterogeneous Firm Level Monitoring 
 In considering employment relations, we follow the efficiency wage model of Shapiro 
and Stiglitz (1984), amending this as needed to mesh with the firm-based model of Melitz 
(2003).  
 In the Shapiro and Stiglitz  model, firms can monitor worker effort only imperfectly. 
Workers’ distaste for effort tempts them to shirk, and they are deterred in equilibrium by the 
possibility that their shirking will be discovered and they will be fired. Unemployment persists in 
equilibrium because the wage that firms offer is too high to clear the labor market. 
Unemployment is bad news for workers, and truly involuntary, in the sense that employed 
workers are ex ante identical to the unemployed yet have higher utility. The market failure is that 
workers cannot credibly commit to effort at less than the going wage. Our model has all these 
features, with the crucial difference that firms differ in their ability to detect shirking.  
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 There is a large literature that tests various aspects of the Shapiro-Stiglitz and other 
efficiency wage models, but there is no paper that directly tests the prediction that monitoring 
ability and high wages are substitute means to elicit effort. There are a number of papers, 
including Groshen and Krueger (1990), Rebitzer (1995), and Nagin, Rebitzer, Sanders and 
Taylor (2002) that use exogenous variation in monitoring intensity to confirm that effort does 
indeed increase in monitoring intensity2. There is also a literature that documents industry wage 
differentials (for example, Krueger and Summers (1988)). Such differentials have no direct 
connection to efficiency wage theory, but they are consistent with labor rents of the sort that 
obtain in the equilibrium of the Shapiro-Stiglitz model.  
 We assume that utility is additively separable in consumption and effort. Utility from 
consumption is given by a standard CES aggregate of differentiated goods, which has an 
associated ideal price index P that is developed in Section IV below. Disutility from effort is 
measured in the same units as the wage. This implies that a household with income wi has 
indirect utility given by:  
(1.1) ii
w eu
P
−=  
An implication of this specification is that real price declines due to technological progress or 
increases in variety, etc. do not lead to a change in the disutility of effort relative to the utility of 
consumption3.  This is the assumption made implicitly by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), although 
the issue of trends in the relative cost of effort did not arise in their steady-state, one-good 
setting.  
 The worker who is employed will need to make a discrete decision to supply a unit of 
effort or to shirk and supply effort 0 . For simplicity, we normalize the wage (or other benefits) 
received by the unemployed to zero.  
 Workers are risk neutral and discount the future at rate 0r > . Workers lose their job only 
if they are caught shirking or if the firm dies, and firm death happens at the exogenous rate δ. 
Firms monitor workers for shirking and im  is an inverse measure of the firm’s monitoring 
effectiveness. Hence if workers at firm i  were to shirk, they would face a probability 1im
− of 
                                                 
2 We have also observed a positive relationship between monitoring intensity and homework effort by resident 
adolescents. We believe that such an effect is well-known to other parents.  
3 In the absence of such a specification, secular progress would be associated with a secular decline in 
unemployment, which is counterfactual  (see Romer (2006), Chapter 10). 
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detection, with a penalty of being fired and spending a period in unemployment before finding a 
new job. We impose the technical condition that [ )0 ,im m∈ ∞ , where the lower bound 0 11m δ≡ −  
is the maximally effective monitoring of any firm.4  
 Workers at firm i  have fundamental asset equations that reflect their status as shirkers or 
non-shirkers. Let SEiV  and 
N
EiV  be the expected lifetime utility respectively of shirkers and non-
shirkers at firm i . Let UV be the expected lifetime utility of a worker currently unemployed 
(noting that this is independent of any firm because unemployed workers are unattached).  
 Then the fundamental asset equations for employed non-shirkers and shirkers 
respectively are:  
(1.2) ( ) ( )N NEi i U EirV w e V Vδ= − + −  
(1.3) ( )( )1S SEi i i U EirV w m V Vδ −= + + −  
 These consist of the flow benefit, ( ) or i iw e w−  respectively, plus an expected capital 
loss in the case of a shift to unemployment, where these terms differ because shirkers face a 
higher probability of a move to unemployment due to the firm’s monitoring 1im
−  for shirking. 
This departs from the conventional Shapiro-Stiglitz framework in allowing for firm specificity in 
monitoring ability, the wage, and the value of employment.  
 Firm i  recognizes the incentive to shirk. Hence in light of these incentives and its own 
monitoring ability, it chooses a wage sufficient to induce employees to work rather than shirk. 
This requires that N SEi EiV V≥ , a non-shirking constraint which firms will choose to meet with 
equality. Solving for the non-shirking wage constraint at firm i , we find: 
(1.4) ( )i U iw rV e r emδ= + + +  
 Equation (1.4) is the firm-level equivalent of the Shapiro-Stiglitz no-shirking constraint. 
First, note that since UV  is common to all firms, wages will vary across firms only due to 
monitoring ability and that equilibrium wages are in a one-to-one increasing relation with a 
firm’s difficulty in monitoring. Second, note also that this is a notional wage. That is, this is the 
                                                 
4 This insures that the instantaneous probability of job loss arising from all sources does not exceed unity. 
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wage required of a firm with monitoring ability im  if it is to elicit effort, and is well defined 
although in equilibrium not all firms will survive.  
 Since all active firms will meet the no-shirking constraint in equilibrium, we can define 
the value of being employed at firm i  by substituting the no-shirking wage back into our 
definition of NEiV  to yield: 
(1.5) Ei U iV V em= +  
 This equation is intuitive. Rearranging, we see that ( )1i Ei Um V V e− − = , or equivalently 
that the probability of being caught shirking times the capital loss associated with this should just 
compensate for the cost of effort. As the firm’s ability to monitor workers deteriorates 
(higher im ), ever higher wage rates are required to induce effort. Moreover, since this reflects the 
required no-shirking wage choice of any firm i , the unemployed will always find it 
advantageous to accept the first job offered.  
 
 B. The No-Shirking Constraint and Aggregation 
 We have derived in Equation (1.4) a link between the firm’s no-shirking wage, various 
parameters of the model, including the firm’s monitoring ability, and the flow benefits of being 
unemployed, UrV .  The unemployed worker does not know ex ante from which firm an offer 
will arrive. Hence consideration of the flow benefits of being unemployed requires aggregation, 
to which we now turn.  
 Later we will address in detail how employment levels at individual firms are 
determined; for now we simply assume that the relevant distribution is known to all in the 
economy. Let ( )if w , then, be the equilibrium density of employed workers at firm i , hence 
receiving wage iw . These are the weights that will be applied in calculating averages for the 
benefits of being employed, for wages, and for monitoring ability of firms.  
 Let EV be the average lifetime utility of an employed non-shirker. Expected job tenure 
doesn’t vary across firms since in equilibrium no one shirks, so job loss happens only at the 
common exogenous rate δ  as firm death. Hence we have  
 ( )E Ei iV V f w di≡ ∫ .   
Correspondingly, the average wage will be: 
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 ( )i iw w f w di≡ ∫  
And the average monitoring ability of firms is:  
 ( )i im m f w di≡ ∫  
 We are now ready to consider the flow benefits of being unemployed. Since unemployed 
workers here receive a zero wage, the flow benefits consist entirely of the expected capital gain 
from re-employment. Let a  be the instantaneous probability of re-employment of an 
unemployed worker. Then the fundamental asset equation for an unemployed worker is: 
 ( )U E UrV a V V= −  
 From equation (1.5), and taking averages, we have that: 
 ( )E UV V em− =  
 so that substituting this in we find: 
(1.6) ( )UrV a em=  
 The instantaneous probability of re-employment of an unemployed worker, a , can be 
examined in terms of the steady state, which requires that flows into and out of unemployment 
be equal. Let L be the total size of the labor force and let U  be the total number of unemployed. 
In equilibrium separations happen at rate δ . Then the steady state imposes that: 
(1.7) ( )aU L Uδ= −  
Substituting (1.8) into (1.6) and defining the unemployment rate to be Uu
L
≡ , we find that  
 1U
urV em
u
δ −⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  
This allows us to eliminate the term UrV  from Equation (1.4), and gives us:  
 1 ( )i i
uw e em r em
u
δ δ−⎛ ⎞= + + +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  
We can use this to calculate the average wage: 
 1 ( )uw e em r em
u
δ δ−⎛ ⎞= + + +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  
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 In order to keep this consistent with the Melitz (2003) model, we will consider this for 
the limiting case in which 0r → .5 Hence the last two equations become: 
 1i i
uw e em em
u
δ δ−⎛ ⎞= + +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ , and  
 1 u ew e em em e m
u u
δδ δ−⎛ ⎞= + + = +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  
 Solving the second of these for ( )w e um
eδ
−= ,  and substituting this into the first, we 
finally arrive at a simple equation relating the wage paid by a firm to the aggregate 
unemployment rate, the average wage, and the firm-specific monitoring cost: 
(1.9) ( )( )1i iw e u w e emδ= + − − +  
 Equation (1.9) shows that the no shirking wage of the firm is increasing in the cost of 
effort e , the firm-specific monitoring cost im , and decreasing in the unemployment rate u , as 
one might expect from Shapiro and Stiglitz. But the firm wage is increasing in the economy-
wide average wage w , an effect Shapiro and Stiglitz couldn’t separately identify. This also 
foreshadows a tradeoff between simultaneous increases in w  and u  that leave iw  unaffected, to 
be discussed further below.  
 The lowest feasible no-shirking wage, Lw , arises in the case of the maximally effective 
monitoring. In this case, 0im m= , and so ( )( ) 01Lw e u w e emδ= + − − + . Because identical 
workers will receive different wages, we cannot follow Melitz in choosing labor as the 
numéraire. Instead, we choose as our numéraire labor employed at tasks in which they earn the 
wage on offer at firms with the maximally effective monitoring technology. Hence 1Lw ≡ , 
which in turn implies:  
(1.10) ( ) ( )( )01 1 1m e u w eδ= + + − − . 
 Moreover, with this choice of numéraire, we can re-write Equation (1.9) as: 
(1.11) ( )01i iw e m mδ= + −  
                                                 
5 We have developed the key expressions here for the case of 0r > , as in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), and as the 
setup requires. Of course, we can see directly that the limits for the relevant expressions exist as 0r → . We choose 
this path since the effects of r  here are purely conventional, but the Melitz (2003) model is developed in a context 
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 Equation (1.11) is extremely important. The foregoing has only assumed that there is 
some equilibrium distribution of wages, ( )if w . From this we have now been able to derive an 
exact relation between the primitive distribution of im  and the notional distribution of wages iw  
that must hold in the no-shirking equilibrium. Wage differences for identical workers arise only 
if there are monitoring differences across firms and the magnitude of these wage differences rises 
proportionately with the monitoring gap itself, the exogenous job separation rate δ , and the level 
of effort e  required to be productive.  
 Returning to the wage equation for the numéraire, Equation (1.10), and solving for the 
link between the unemployment rate and the average wage consistent with non-shirking, we find: 
(1.12) 01w emu
w e
δ− += −  
It is straightforward to show that the no-shirking unemployment rate for the relevant case is 
positive, increasing, and concave in the average wage w .6 Unemployment in this model is 
involuntary in precisely the same way as Shapiro-Stiglitz.  
  Equation (1.12) highlights a crucial difference, though, between the standard Shapiro-
Stiglitz framework and the present approach. In the standard Shapiro-Stiglitz model, all firms are 
identical, hence it is impossible to separately identify the effect of the firm’s own wage and the 
economy’s average wage on incentives to shirk and equilibrium unemployment. Their aggregate 
no-shirking condition, then, shows the total effect of a simultaneous rise in the firm and average 
                                                                                                                                                             
where the source of firm discounting is limited to the instantaneous firm death rate δ . Effectively, taking limits at 
this point just rids us of a nuisance parameter.  
6 With the maximally effective monitoring wage at unity, the average wage cannot be lower, so the numerator in 
Equation (1.12) is positive. Note that w e>  or at least some of the workers would shirk (contrary to assumption), 
so the denominator is also positive. These two facts combined imply that equilibrium unemployment must be 
positive. Employment is feasible, i.e. 1u < , whenever the effort cost of being productive is not too high relative to 
the product of the effective discount factor from exogenous job separations times the probability of being detected 
when shirking at the maximally effective monitoring firms, or 10
1
1
e m
e δ
−<− .  We also see that 
( )
0
2
1 (1 )e mdu
dw w e
δ− += − , which is positive under the same conditions that make employment feasible. Further, 
( )
( )
2
0
32
2 1 (1 )e md u
dw w e
δ− − += −  is negative under the same conditions. While a rise in the average wage raises the 
equilibrium unemployment rate, the sensitivity of the unemployment rate to movements in average wages is greatest 
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wage, and shows that this wage rise reduces equilibrium unemployment along the no-shirking 
constraint. It would be simple to conclude that with efficiency wages a rise in prevailing wages 
inevitably reduces equilibrium unemployment. This would, though, be incorrect.  
 Our equation (1.9) shows that, as in Shapiro and Stiglitz, there is a negative relation 
between the firm’s own wage and the level of required unemployment consistent with no 
shirking. But equation (1.12) shows, by contrast, that there is a positive relation between the 
average wage and the equilibrium no-shirking unemployment rate.  
 The contrast is simple to understand. A fall in the unemployment rate on its own always 
makes shirking more attractive. For the no-shirking constraint to be met weakly requires 
something that makes shirking less attractive. At the firm level, the fall in the unemployment rate 
requires a rise in the firm’s wage to prevent shirking, hence unemployment and the firm’s wage 
have an inverse relation. When considering the average wage, though, a drop in the 
unemployment rate that makes shirking more tempting must be met with a drop in the average 
wage to make shirking less tempting, since the average wage is the wage a fired worker receives 
when eventually re-employed. Thus, while the unemployment rate and the firm’s own wage are 
negatively related, the unemployment rate and the average wage must be positively related. This 
contrast will be key to our results below.  
 In our model, the average wage will be able to move through firm selection effects even 
when the wage is constant among all active firms. When these selection effects lead the average 
wage to rise, unemployment will have to rise as well.  
  Let us take stock of what this section has achieved. We have derived a simple relation 
between the unemployment rate and the average wage consistent with a no-shirking equilibrium. 
We have also derived a simple relation between the equilibrium no-shirking wage offered at 
individual firms and exogenous firm-level monitoring ability. These will be crucial in developing 
our model of the product market.  
 Shapiro and Stiglitz closed their model with a neoclassical labor demand approach 
featuring identical competitive firms (even if the firms recognized the binding nature of the no-
shirking constraint). We will go on now to develop a monopolistically competitive product 
                                                                                                                                                             
when average wages are relatively low. We will focus precisely on these cases for which equilibrium unemployment 
is ( )0,1u∈ . 
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market as the basis for our model of labor demand, one that will feature firm heterogeneity not 
only in productivity, as in Melitz, but also in monitoring ability.  
 
III. Links Between The Models of Heterogeneity in Productivity and Monitoring 
 In this section we develop a variant of the heterogeneous firm model of Melitz (2003) 
and show how to link it to the heterogeneous efficiency wages model based on Shapiro and 
Stiglitz (1984) that we derived in Section II. We first discuss the high level links between the 
models and then derive the key elements formally.  
 Equilibrium in a standard Melitz model may be analyzed in three parts – structure, scale, 
and the link between the two. By the equilibrium structure, we mean the price, quantity, wage 
bill, and profits for each firm i  per unit mass of firms. In the Melitz framework, and for given 
parameters, this is fully determined by the distribution of marginal costs across firms. And in 
Melitz’s own model, the variation in marginal costs across firms is fully described by the 
variation in firm physical productivity in marginal cost, indexed by iϕ .  
 By equilibrium scale in a Melitz model, we mean the mass M  of firms of each type that 
is required to insure equilibrium in the labor market. Given Melitz’s assumption of competitive 
labor markets, this determines the mass M from full employment of the labor force L  given the 
economy’s structure.  
 Finally, the link between structure and scale comes from the labor demand per unit mass 
implied by the equilibrium structure of the economy. This is given by the total revenue per unit 
mass divided by the average wage, where both are defined to include entry, fixed, and marginal 
costs. This takes a particularly simple form in Melitz, where all firms pay a common competitive 
wage, taken as the numéraire, and so labor demand per unit mass is simply equal to revenue for 
this mass.  
 Turning to our model, equilibrium structure is also fully determined by the distribution of 
marginal costs across firms. However marginal costs in our model vary across firms not only due 
to variation in firm level productivity, iϕ , but also due to firm-specific no-shirking wages iw  in 
marginal cost activities. Indeed firm marginal costs will be given as the ratio of these two, i
i
w
ϕ . 
Our measure of inverse marginal costs (productivity) is then defined as ii
i
z
w
ϕ≡ . This allows us 
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to use Melitz’s results on the determination of the economy’s structure as a function of the 
distribution of marginal costs without modification, where these are now indexed by iz .  
 Equilibrium scale of the economy also differs from Melitz. It still features adjustment of 
the mass of firms M to ensure labor market equilibrium. However labor market equilibrium now 
requires this mass to adjust so that total labor demand equals the total labor force adjusted for the 
unemployment rate u . From our firm-based efficiency wage model, the unemployment rate u  is 
in a one-to-one relation with the average wage w . And the average wage w  is itself determined 
by the structure of the economy.  
 The link between the structure and scale of the economy also varies from that of Melitz. 
As before, this link comes from labor demand per unit mass implied by the equilibrium structure 
of the economy. Again, this is given by total revenue per unit mass divided by the average wage, 
both defined to include entry, fixed, and marginal costs. However, because we no longer have 
competitive factor markets, the average wage departs from unity. Hence we have to take the total 
revenue and average wage, as determined by the equilibrium structure of the economy, and 
convert these into the implied labor demand per unit mass of firms. The total mass of firms then 
adjusts to attain labor market equilibrium, which here requires that that total employment is 
consistent with the unemployment rate required for non-shirking given this same average wage.  
 In sum, just a few elements serve to link the models. To follow the Melitz framework, all 
firm variation in costs must affect only marginal costs. Hence we assume all firms have common 
monitoring and pay a common wage fw  in all fixed cost activities. For convenience, we assume 
that these fixed cost activities have the maximally effective monitoring, which from Section II 
implies 1fw ≡ . Hence firm level variation in monitoring will affect only wages in marginal cost 
activities, giving rise to marginal costs 1 i
i i
w
z ϕ= . These firm level marginal costs, combined with 
the distribution of firm types, determine the structure of the economy. This structure, again in 
combination with the distribution of firm types, determines the average wage. The average wage, 
in combination with results from Section II, determines the unemployment rate u  as well as the 
labor demand per unit mass of firms. And these in turn determine the equilibrium mass of firms 
in the economy, hence the full equilibrium.  
 We turn now to show these results more formally.  
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IV. The Product Market 
 A. The Consumer’s Problem 
 Preferences over goods are identical and homothetic, hence can be represented by those 
of a representative consumer. The representative consumer’s problem is identical to that in Dixit 
and Stiglitz (1977) and Melitz (2003). Consumers allocate expenditures across available varieties 
to: 
 
( )
1
Min ( ) ( )
. .  = 
E p i q i di
s t q i di Uρ ρ
=
⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
∫
∫
 
We also have 10 1,   and   
1
ρ σ ρ< < = − . 
 These deliver demand curves for product i  of the form: 
 ( )( ) p iq i Q
P
σ−⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  
where Q U≡ and P  is an aggregate price index given by 
 
1
1 1( )P p i diσ σ− −⎡ ⎤= ⎣ ⎦∫  
The demand curve above is a key input to the producer’s problem.  
 
 B. The Producer’s Problem  
 Firms face a sequence of problems. There is an unbounded mass of potential firms. In the 
first stage, a mass M  of firms will enter, pay a fixed entry cost of ef , and receive information 
about their type. Here a firm’s type is represented by the pair ( ),i imϕ  covering both productivity 
and monitoring ability in variable costs. We saw above in equation (1.11) that there is a simple 
relation between equilibrium no-shirking wages and monitoring, given by ( )01i iw e m mδ= + − . 
This means that the firm can immediately translate the productivity-monitoring draw ( ),i imϕ  to 
a productivity-wage draw ( ),i iwϕ . As it turns out, the firm’s individual choices are affected only 
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by the ratio ii
i
z
w
ϕ≡ , although we will be interested in examining iϕ  and iw  separately in order 
to analyze market equilibrium.  
 Here iz  can be thought of equivalently as wage-adjusted productivity in marginal cost or 
as the inverse marginal cost for firm i . Having learned its type iz , firm i  will produce if its 
variable profits cover its per period fixed costs f ; otherwise it will exit before producing. In 
what follows, we work from the individual firm problem and aggregate up.  
 
 C. The Individual Firm 
 We consider now the problem of an individual firm that has already sunk the cost ef  to 
learn its type iz . Physical labor requirements in firm iz  follow Melitz:  
 ( )( , ) ii i
i
q zz fϕ ϕ= +A  
Note that firm level physical labor demand requires knowledge of iϕ  (not only iz ), so must be 
recovered to establish labor market equilibrium once the structure of the economy (including the 
wage bill for a firm of type iz ) is determined.  
 As we noted, our use of the Melitz approach requires that the only locus of firm level 
variation is in marginal costs. Hence we assume that the firm pays a wage 1fw ≡  for labor 
employed in its fixed costs and a wage iw  for labor employed in its variable costs.  
 A particular firm i  thus faces a demand curve as defined in the consumer’s problem 
above and chooses output to maximize profits, 
 i ii i i i i i
i i
q qp q f w p q f
z
π ϕ= ⋅ − − = ⋅ − −  
The first order conditions yield the familiar price as a markup on marginal cost: 
 1( ) ii
i i
wp z
zρϕ ρ= =  
Prices and maximized profits vary across firms only because of variation in iz .  That is, firms 
with a common inverse marginal cost z  may be paying different wages, which are offset by 
productivity differences, but they charge the same price, will produce the same quantity, and 
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have the same revenue and profits. Hence we will drop the subscript i  henceforth except as 
necessary to clarify limits of integration.  
 
 D. Aggregation 
 We have seen that the combination of a primitive distribution on ( ),i imϕ  and the 
equilibrium from the labor market, we can derive the joint distribution for ( ),i iwϕ . Knowledge 
of this joint distribution allows us as well to calculate the distribution of inverse marginal costs 
z
w
ϕ≡  with cumulative distribution function [ ]( ) PrG z Z z≡ ≤  and density ( )g z . The full 
equilibrium will feature a cutoff level of inverse marginal cost, *z , such that firms with *z z<  
exit immediately upon learning of their draw.  
 Given ( )g z , we can also define the equilibrium density of active firms: 
 ( ) ( )( ) ), ,1
g z
z z z
G z
µ ∗∗ ⎡= ∈ ∞⎣−  
If there is a mass M  of firms, then the number of them at any given inverse marginal cost z  is 
( )Mg z , and the number of those that survive and produce is ( )M zµ .  
 The definition of the CES price index gives 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1
11
*
1
1 111
*
1
1
   
   
z
z
P p z M z dz
M p z z dz
M p
σσ
σσσ
σ
µ
µ
∞ −−
∞ −−−
−
⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
=
∫
∫

 
where p  is implicitly defined in the last step. As usual in this type of model, holding the density 
of firms fixed, the price level is decreasing in the number of firms, which is the love-of-variety 
effect.  
 Substituting in ( ) ( ) 1p z zρ −= gives 
 ( )
1
1
1 1
*
1
z
p z z dz
z
σσ σρ µ ρ
∞ −− −⎡ ⎤= =⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫   
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where, making the dependence of z  on *z  explicit,  
 ( ) ( )
1
1
1
*
*
z
z z z z dz
σσ µ
∞ −−⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫  
 This last variable, z , is a measure of aggregate inverse marginal costs and plays a key 
role in the determination of equilibrium in the product market.  
 
 E. The Marginal Firm and Equilibrium Structure of the Economy 
 Equilibrium structure in an autarkic Melitz economy is determined by the solution of two 
relations between average profits π  and the marginal cost of the marginal entrant *z . The first 
of these two relations is a free entry condition (FE), which asserts that from an unbounded set of 
ex ante identical firms, a sufficient mass enters so that the average profits from entry equal the 
fixed cost of entry. Written in these terms, the FE condition is: 
 ( )1 * eG z fπδ⎡ ⎤− =⎣ ⎦  
 For a given marginal entrant *z , ( )1 *G z−  is the ex ante probability of successful entry, 
π  the per-period average profits for successful entrants, and 1δ  the factor that yields expected 
value when the stochastic exit rate for successful firms is δ . Solving, we have: 
 ( ) ( )* 1 *e
fz
G z
δπ = −  (FE) 
 This formulation points at the path to solution, which is to link average profits to the 
marginal entrant. The first step draws on the aggregate measure of inverse marginal cost ( )z z∗ , 
from above. The second step is to show that total profits can be written as ( )M zπΠ =  , so that 
average profits are: 
 ( ) ( )* ( *)z z z
M
π π Π= = . 
The proof follows Melitz and is omitted here. 
 The second of the two key relations is the zero cutoff productivity (ZCP), which requires 
that the firms with the highest marginal costs that actually produce should have variable profits 
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equal to the per-period fixed cost, or ( *)V z fπ = . To convert this to a form amenable to the 
simple determination of equilibrium via as a function of *zπ  requires only a few more steps.  
 Generally, variable profits for an active firm are given by ( )( )V r zzπ σ= , and the revenue 
for this firm is given by ( ) [ ] 1r z R P z σρ −= . Ratios of variable profits are equal to the ratio of 
revenues and depend only on the ratio of inverse marginal costs, so that we can write 
( ) ( )
1
1
1 2
2
V Vzz z
z
σ
π π
−⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 for any active 1 2and z z . Recalling that ( )zπ   is equal to average 
profits π , we can write this out for inverse marginal costs z  and *z  as 
1( *) ( *)
*
z z r z f
z
σ
π σ
−⎡ ⎤= −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦

. If we further define 
1( *)( *) 1
*
z zk z
z
σ −⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪⎡ ⎤= −⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭

, and recall that the zero 
cutoff productivity has ( *)r z fσ = , we can impose this condition by requiring: 
 ( *)fk zπ =  (ZCP) 
The remainder of the derivation follows Melitz and is omitted. 
 The Free Entry and Zero Cutoff Productivity conditions define two relations in π  and 
*z  and can be solved for equilibrium values as in Melitz. The equilibrium exists and is unique 
under the same conditions.  
 The equilibrium *z  completely determines the structure of the economy. We now need 
to go on to recover the average wage, determine the associated unemployment rate consistent 
with no-shirking, and thus determine the mass of firms that provides for equilibrium in the labor 
market.  
 
 F. Labor Supply and Demand 
 The labor force in our model is divided into four elements: 
 U the unemployed 
 Le workers in fixed entry cost sector 
 Lf workers in per-period fixed cost activities 
 LV workers in variable cost activities 
The aggregate labor force constraint is 
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 e f VL U L L L= + + +  
 For entry, we need to consider the steady state. The number of new entrants every period 
is a fraction of the incumbents which is exactly equal to the number of firm deaths, Mδ . Thus 
labor devoted to new entry in steady state is: 
 e eL Mfδ=  
 The physical levels of employment in fixed cost is simply  
 fL Mf=  
 For the variable cost activity, we now have to make precise the distinction between 
wages and physical marginal productivity. It is the latter that gives employment in each firm. 
The complexity arises because firms with a given z  (and hence a given level of output) may 
have an infinite number of physical productivities ϕ .  
 Physical variable labor demand for firm i  is given by ( )( , ) iVi i i
i
q zz ϕ ϕ=A . From the joint 
distribution of ( ),i iwϕ  and the equilibrium *z  we can construct the equilibrium joint 
distribution represented by the density ( , )i izψ ϕ . With the mass of firms M and this joint density, 
total employment in variable costs is given by: 
 
*
( ) ( , )
i
i
V i i
iz i z
q zL M z didzψ ϕϕ
∞
∈
= ∫ ∫  
 We can now write the labor market clearing condition in quantity terms as: 
 
*
( )(1 ) ( , )
i
i
e i i
iz i z
q zu L M f f z didzδ ψ ϕϕ
∞
∈
⎡ ⎤− = + +⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫ ∫  
 Note that for a given unemployment rate u  (hence average wage w ), the mass of firms 
M  is directly proportional to the labor force size L  and employment ( )1 u L− . 
 
 G. Average Wages 
 Now we turn to determining average wages. Multiplying each firm’s employment of 
labor in variable cost ( )( , ) iVi i i
i
q zz ϕ ϕ=A  by the firm-specific wage wi gives the firm’s wage bill in 
variable cost as   
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 ( ) [ ]1 1z q z z Q P σσ ρ− −=  
which allows us to conclude that aggregate payments to labor in variable cost are 
 [ ] ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ]1 1 1
z z
M z Q P z dz MQ P z z dz MQ P zσ σ σσ σ σρ µ ρ µ ρ
∗ ∗
∞ ∞
− − −= =∫ ∫   
which, using  
 ( ) ( )1 1 11,Q M q z P M zρ σ ρ −−= =  ,   
becomes 
 ( )q zM
z

  
To get total payments to labor we add employment in fixed and entry cost activities, where the 
wage is one. Thus aggregate payments to labor are 
 ( )e q zM f f zδ
⎛ ⎞+ +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠

  
so the average wage is 
 ( )
( )
1 e
q zMw f f
u L z
δ⎛ ⎞= + +⎜ ⎟− ⎝ ⎠

  
 
 H. Equilibrium in the Labor Market 
 With the structure of the economy determined by *z  in Section IV.E., we now have three 
equations in three unknowns, ,  ,  and Mu w . 
 From Section IV.F, the physical labor market clearing condition: 
 
*
( )(1 ) ( , )
i
i
e i i
iz i z
q zu L M f f z didzδ ψ ϕϕ
∞
∈
⎡ ⎤− = + +⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫ ∫     
 From Section IV.G, we find that the average wage satisfies: 
 ( )
( )
1 e
q zMw f f
u L z
δ⎛ ⎞= + +⎜ ⎟− ⎝ ⎠

  
 And from Section II, the no-shirking constraint requires:  
  01w emu
w e
δ− += −  
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We can substitute the first of these equations into the second to solve for w . We then substitute 
w  into the no-shirking constraint to get u, and solve for M  by substituting back into the section 
IV.G equation for w . This completes the solution of the model. 
 
V. Autarky to Free Trade in Two Special Cases 
 We have developed a general model that integrates the Melitz model of heterogeneity in 
firm productivity with a Shapiro-Stiglitz model amended to allow for heterogeneity in firm 
monitoring abilities. We have shown that the structure of the economy is isomorphic to that in 
Melitz and a function of firm marginal costs 1ii
i i
wmc
zϕ= = , which depend on firm variation in 
both wages and productivity. Before turning to examine the consequences of trade liberalization 
in the general case, it will prove useful to consider two special cases, each of which shuts down 
one of the two influences on marginal costs.  
 
  A. The Melitz-Type Model 
 Our first special case is what we term a “Melitz-type” model. Marginal costs are assumed 
to vary with heterogeneity in firm productivity, but we assume that all firms have the same 
monitoring ability, which for convenience we assume are at the maximal attainable level. With 
1iw ≡ , we have 1 1i
i i
mc
zϕ= = , as in Melitz. Figures 1A and 1B illustrate results familiar from 
Melitz, where in the ( , )i iw ϕ  space, all firms lie on the 1iw ≡  line. In autarky, firms whose 
marginal costs are higher than *amc  (productivity lower than 
*
aϕ ) exit without producing.  
 In a move from autarky to free trade steady states, the highest marginal cost (lowest 
productivity) firms )* *,amc mc⎡⎣ exit; the next lower marginal cost firms )*, xmc mc⎡⎣ contract; the 
next lower marginal cost firms ), ,xmc mcπ⎡⎣  succeed in exporting, although their profits fall; and 
finally the lowest marginal cost firms, mc mcπ≤ , become super-exporters and raise their profits. 
Homogeneous labor and a common monitoring technology imply that nominal wages are 
unchanged. Still, the economy achieves higher productivity through the elimination or 
contraction of high marginal cost firms to the benefit of low marginal cost firms. And workers 
will be better off as a result of the availability of cheap imported varieties and through a possible 
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increase in variety available locally. Interestingly, the fact that the average wage does not change 
implies that neither will there be a change in the unemployment rate (see Equation (1.12)). 
Within the context of our model, this justifies Melitz in having put aside issues of aggregate 
unemployment, since if the only source of heterogeneity in firm marginal costs is firm-level 
productivity, then unemployment, while it does exist, does not change in the move from autarky 
to free trade7.  
 The Melitz model has many great features. But its constraint that all wages for all 
workers are identical makes it impossible to make sense of public concerns that trade destroys 
good jobs – no job is any better than any other. And the fact that there are aggregate gains from 
liberalization combined with the homogeneity of jobs suggests that all workers will benefit, at 
least eventually, from such a liberalization. This makes it hard to make sense of worker concern 
about trade and suggests the need for a richer model in which there is a clear sense of some jobs 
being better than others.8  
 
  B. Firm-Level Variation Only in Wages 
 A second special case arises when we abstract from heterogeneity in firm productivity 
and allow only for heterogeneity in firm monitoring, hence in wages. For this case, we set 1iϕ ≡  
and thus have 1i i
i
mc w
z
= = . Hence in this case, we can speak synonymously of marginal costs 
or wages. Note also that the fact that identical workers receive different wages at different firms 
means that workers perceive some jobs as being better than others. Figures 2A and 2B illustrate 
the relevant cases in autarky and in a move from autarky to free trade. In the figures, all firms in 
the ( , )i iw ϕ  space lie on the 1iϕ =  line at wages 1iw ≥ . Exactly as in the previous case, in 
autarky firms with high marginal costs exit before producing. However, since all firms now have 
the same productivity, variation in marginal costs arises only due to differences in the wages that 
must be paid. Hence firms in autarky whose poor monitoring technology would require wages 
*
i aw mc>  exit before producing.  
                                                 
7 This result contrasts with Matusz (1996), where trade liberalization in a monopolistic competition model reduces 
unemployment. The key to the difference is that in Matusz’ specification an equilibrium increase in variety reduces 
the incentive to shirk. Our specification of utility neutralizes this effect, for reasons discussed in section II.A 
8 As noted by Kletzer (2001), import-related job losses are often associated with extended spells of unemployment 
and substantial declines in wages when re-employed. 
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 This model also provides a first opportunity to make sense of the public perception that 
free trade destroys good jobs at good wages. In a move from autarky to free trade, the highest 
wage firms in existence, those with wages ( * *,i aw w w ⎤∈ ⎦ , exit and all the high wage jobs at these 
firms are destroyed. The existing firms that offer the next highest wages, those with 
( *,i xw w w ⎤∈ ⎦  contract and dismiss some of their workers. As we head down in the wage 
distribution to relatively low paying jobs, those with wages in the range ( ,i xw w wπ ⎤∈ ⎦ , firms 
expand employment to reach new export markets, but even this export success is insufficient to 
raise their total profits. Employment expands most sharply at the firms offering the lowest 
wages, those in the range 1,iw wπ⎡ ⎤∈ ⎣ ⎦ . And it is only these last firms, the ones offering the 
lowest wages and who become super-exporters, who actually have their profits rise as a result of 
liberalization. Indeed, the profit gains to these firms offering the lowest wages exceed the 
combined profit losses to all other firms, including those forced to exit.  
 Since the output response is greater at firms offering lower and lower wages, we can be 
sure that the average wage falls in the move from autarky to free trade. One compensation in this 
case is that the aggregate unemployment rate will for this reason fall. All workers will also 
benefit from the lower prices and possibly increased variety arising from trade. However, with a 
lower average wage, and all of the highest paying jobs eliminated from the economy, there are 
likely to be many workers who see themselves as worse off on account of liberalization.  
 This model in which the only source of variation in marginal costs is due to firm 
differences in wages has the great merit that it presents a very stark articulation of the public 
concerns that trade destroys good jobs at good wages. In this model, it does. If we constrain all 
firms to have a common technology, then those that pay the highest wages are at risk of exit or 
contraction in the move from autarky to free trade. Trade destroys the best jobs.  
 Nevertheless, there are good reasons to believe that this model in which all variation in 
firm level marginal costs is due to differences in wages is at best incomplete. Most pointedly, it 
would have the implication that high wage firms are also small and unprofitable firms. The data 
contradict this (Idson and Oi, 1999). Like the Melitz model, which allowed marginal costs to 
vary only with firm productivity, this model in which marginal costs vary only due to firm level 
wage differences has important shortcomings. We will now turn to the general model, which 
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allows for marginal costs to vary for both reasons to see that we can address the concerns that 
arise in the two special cases.  
 
VI. Trade Liberalization in the General Case 
 This section will consider the consequences for firms and workers of trade liberalization 
in our general model. Sections VI.A. and VI.B. consider this in detail for the case of a move 
from autarky to free trade. In Section VI.C., we will discuss t liberalization in economies that are 
already partially open.  
 We divide our discussion of a move from autarky to free trade into two pieces. The first 
will consider the case of a liberalization that affects the structure of the economy, but not its 
scale. As discussed above, the link in our model between structure and scale is the average wage 
relative to the maximally effective monitoring wage, through the impact of this average wage on 
the equilibrium unemployment rate. Depending on the primitive distribution of productivity and 
monitoring ( ),i imϕ , our model is consistent with either a rise or fall in this average wage with 
liberalization. As a base case, we begin by assuming that liberalization has no impact on this 
average wage. This implies that the structure of the economy will change, but not its scale, as the 
unchanged average wage neutralizes any impact on aggregate employment. Once the analysis of 
a change in structure is complete, we go on to consider how we would need to amend the 
conclusions of that analysis once we allow for changes in scale as well.  
 The analysis in this section, in formal terms, is comparative steady state analysis. A 
complete analysis of the time path of adjustment would be required to make definitive statements 
about welfare and political economy. That is beyond the scope of this paper. Nonetheless, the 
basic nature of the adjustments required along the path to the new steady state does emerge from 
our model. We believe that this provides a powerful heuristic for understanding the forces at 
work in identifying winners and losers, hence also in understanding the political economy of 
liberalization.  
 
  A. Changes in Structure Only  
 We consider here the special case in which our economies move from autarky to free 
trade, but in which the average wage relative to the maximally effective monitoring wage is 
unchanged. With an unchanged average wage, aggregate employment is unchanged. This implies 
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that the analysis of the structure of firms’ price and output decisions in the product market, as 
well as profit, entry and exit, will be precisely as in Melitz, so long as we use our own measure 
of inverse marginal cost, given by z. Here, though, workers have attachments to specific firms 
because of rents created by differences at the firm level in wages.  
 We can use Figures 3A and 3B to think about the comparison of autarky and free trade as 
it affects profits of firms and employment of workers. The lowest feasible wage is the maximal 
monitoring wage and equals one by choice of numéraire. In Figure 3A, the ray labeled *amc  
indicates the highest level of marginal cost consistent with zero post-entry profits, and thus 
defines the cutoff for active firms. Firms with lower marginal costs are to the southeast of the 
*
amc  ray, and firm size is monotonically decreasing in marginal cost. An implication is that even 
if monitoring ability and physical productivity are ex ante uncorrelated, there will be an ex post 
correlation between productivity and wages, because only high productivity firms can afford to 
stay in business while paying high wages. If ex ante monitoring costs and productivity are 
positively correlated, our model offers a potential explanation for the firm size-wage premium: 
highly productive firms are likely to have higher monitoring costs and consequently pay higher 
wages. As long as the high wages don’t completely offset high productivity, high wage firms 
will also be big firms on average (this conjecture was also made by  Bulow and Summers 
(1986)).  Our model is quite consistent with the Idson and Oi (1999) explanation for the firm 
size-wage premium.  Idson and Oi dismiss the efficiency wage model on theoretical grounds and 
claim in their title that “Workers are more productive in large firms” which is why they are paid 
more. With an ex ante correlation between monitoring costs and productivity, efficiency wages 
and productivity are complementary rather than substitute explanations for the firm size-wage 
premium.   
 The impact of the shift in comparative steady states from autarky to trade, illustrated in 
Figure 3B, gives rise to three additional critical values in inverse marginal costs. The first is  
*mc , the marginal entrant under free trade. Next is xmc , the marginal exporter. Finally is mcπ , 
the highest marginal cost for which a firm sees its profits rise with free trade. Accordingly, these 
boundaries define Regions I to IV in the figure.  
 The impact of trade on firms’ profits and output is straightforward. All firms in Region I 
exit with trade, so their profits and output fall to zero. Firms in Regions II and III also see a 
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decline in profits. For firms in Region II, the entry of foreign firms into their home market 
reduces their domestic demand and profits, yet leaves them incapable of finding a sufficient 
foreign market to justify the fixed costs of exporting. Output for these firms declines. It is 
notable that firms in Region III suffer a decline in profits in spite of the fact that they not only 
survive in the domestic market but also find a foreign market for their products; the losses in the 
home market are not fully compensated by the new profits in the export market. Total output for 
these firms expands and so the decline in profits is attached to the fixed cost of entering the 
export market. Only the largest firms, those in Region IV, find that their profits rise with trade. 
Notably, firms can find their way into Region IV either by their inherent productivity or by 
effective monitoring of workers, which allows them to elicit effort at low wages.  
 The analysis of the impact on workers is only slightly more complex. We have set aside 
until the next subsection any impact of trade on the average wage and equilibrium 
unemployment. The wage of a worker who maintains employment at a specific firm is 
determined by the firm specific monitoring technology and parameters of the model, so is 
unaffected by trade liberalization (see Equation (1.11)).  
 This leaves only two channels for trade to affect workers. The first, as in Melitz, is that 
liberalization lowers the typical price and may raise total variety of products available to workers 
qua consumers. This benefits all workers and should be considered as a potential offset to losses 
incurred by some workers.  
 The second channel for trade to affect workers here is via changes in employment, which 
is most directly related to the fate of firms in the output market. We have already seen that firms 
in Region I exit the market, hence all workers at these firms lose their jobs. Firms in Region II 
contract their output, hence workers at these firms may be seen as facing a probability of job loss 
related to the degree of contraction. Firms in Regions III and IV expand employment sufficiently 
in the new steady state to provide precisely the same number of new jobs as those lost via firings 
among firms in Regions I and II.  
 Workers at firms in Regions III and IV should expect to be unambiguously better off with 
the move from autarky to free trade. The firms there are expanding output, so should have no 
unusual layoffs. And they enjoy gains from lower typical prices and possibly increased variety.  
 The situation is more intricate for workers initially with firms in Regions I and II. As 
noted, on one side are the common variety and price gains from liberalization. On the other side 
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is the certainty (Region I) or probability (Region II) of job loss. In the model workers must pass 
through a period of unemployment before finding new employment. Since workers always prefer 
to be employed rather than unemployed, this is a cost. The magnitude of the cost of a job loss is 
higher the higher the initial wage.  
 This also provides an additional window on the debate over whether trade liberalization 
threatens “good jobs”. The selection effects can be viewed from two perspectives. The first is to 
fix a productivity level 0ϕ  and consider the effect of variations in iw  on selection, and then 
considering the reverse relation, fixing a wage 0w  and consider the selection effects of variation 
in iϕ . 
 To the previous diagram, Figure 4 adds the average wage in autarky, aw , and a specific 
productivity level 0ϕ , which for illustrative purposes was chosen to intersect the average wage 
line at the boundary of Regions II and III. Perhaps the simplest definition of a “good job” in 
autarky is one that pays a wage above the average, i.e. a aw w> . Holding productivity fixed at 
0ϕ , we see that trade threatens all and only good jobs. Controlling for firm productivity 0ϕ , the 
highest paying jobs are those in Region I – all of which are lost in the opening to trade. The next 
highest paying jobs are those in Region II – some, but not all, of which will be lost to trade. 
Controlling for productivity, only the lowest paying jobs survive the opening to trade. Indeed, 
trade leads to an expansion of these jobs and most sharply among the lowest paying of these 
(those along 0ϕ  in Region IV).  
 We see that the public perception that trade destroys good jobs at good wages does have 
foundation in the context of this model. Some workers who in autarky would enjoy high wages 
will find that a move to free trade eliminates their jobs. Indeed, if we condition on productivity, 
trade always destroys the best jobs.  
 Having acknowledged this, it is also crucial to understand the limits of this way of 
thinking. Yes, trade will eliminate some of what workers perceive as good jobs, and conditioning 
on productivity, trade always destroys the best jobs. Yet this is perfectly consistent with the 
possibility that trade will simultaneously expand the number of high wage jobs sufficiently that 
the average wage will rise. Indeed, we will argue below why we think this is the normal case. 
The net gain for specific workers and for workers as a whole will then need to account for 
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changes in prices and variety, which will typically be additional sources of gain, as well as for 
changes in aggregate unemployment.  
 
  B. Changes in Structure and Scale 
 We have just examined the consequences of a move from autarky to free trade under the 
assumption that this liberalization does not affect the average wage. This allowed us to separate 
the question of structure from that of scale, a question to which we now turn.  
 We need to consider a few issues. The first is whether a rise in the average wage is more 
likely than a fall or vice versa. The second concerns the macro implications of equilibrium 
changes in the average wage. Finally, we discuss how these considerations lead us to amend the 
conclusions from the previous subsection.  
  1. The Average Wage, Macro Effects, and the New Steady State 
 In considering the likely impact of trade liberalization on the average wage, as discussed 
above, there are two seemingly conflicting forces. At each level of productivity, employment 
contracts most sharply at the highest wage firms and expands most rapidly at the lowest wage 
firms. However, at each wage level, firm survival depends on productivity. Thus there are 
selection effects that favor productive firms that are more able to survive in the face of high 
required wages. Which effect will dominate in its effect on the average wage – the loss of good 
jobs controlling for productivity, or the expansion of jobs at high productivity firms?  
 The logic of our model does not mandate that a move from autarky to free trade raise the 
average wage – this depends on the distribution of firm productivity and monitoring abilities as 
well as the induced changes in outputs. Nonetheless, in the context of this model, we have 
discussed above that there are very good empirical reasons to believe that liberalization does 
raise average wages. Recall that marginal costs provide both an ordering by firm size and also an 
ordering of the output response to the move from autarky to free trade (see Figure 5). If firm size 
is positively correlated with the wage (as it is in data; see, for example, Idson and Oi (1999)), 
then a liberalization that leads to a contraction of small firms and expansion of large firms will 
raise the average wage. We will take this as the central case and discuss its implications.  
 The macro implications of changes in the average wage come directly from our 
heterogeneous firm model of efficiency wages: a rise in the average wage raises equilibrium 
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unemployment. From Equation  (1.12): 01w emu
w e
δ− += − . The mechanism is that individual firm 
wages are already tied down by the monitoring technology and other parameters of the model. 
Firm selection effects that raise the average wage also reduce the penalty associated with 
shirking (since the average wage is what unemployed workers expect to earn when re-
employed). If employed workers are to provide effort in equilibrium, structural unemployment 
must rise.  
 This rise in unemployment relative to the case of no change in the average wage changes 
the scale of the economy, but not its structure. Because of the general second best nature of the 
economy, with a sufficient rise in the unemployment rate, total real income can decline with 
liberalization, even as the average wage for those who find employment rises. Similarly, even as 
the average price of products declines, there can be a rise in the economy’s price index because 
the rise in unemployment causes a decline in the total mass of varieties available in the market. 
The fact that the possibility of absolute losses can arise in a model with factor market distortions 
is to be expected, although such an outcome in the world seems unlikely.  
 The rise in unemployment anticipated with the move from autarky to free trade reduces 
the steady state mass of firms of each type relative to the previous case in which employment 
was unchanged. In principle, a sufficiently sharp rise in average wages, accompanied with a 
sharp rise in the required unemployment rate, could lead to a reduction of the presence even of 
the most productive export firm types in the new steady state and a loss in total employment 
there.9  
 
                                                 
9 While the present paper develops only comparative steady states, it would be interesting to study transition 
dynamics for the case in which the rise in the average wage, hence also the unemployment rate, in the new steady 
state requires a smaller mass even of the highly productive firm types. We conjecture that in this case the transition 
will feature overshooting of both the average wage and the unemployment rate along the path to the new steady 
state. The logic is simple. Apart from exogenous firm deaths, firm exits only arise when expected present discounted 
profits are negative. But firm profits are monotonically decreasing in marginal costs. Hence if the “crowding” of the 
market by the excess prevalence of low marginal cost firms during the transition relative to the steady state leads to 
exit, this exit will be among the highest marginal cost (small) firms. But if indeed these small firms are on average 
also the low wage firms, then this change in composition will lead the average wage to be higher in the transition 
than in the steady state. All else equal, the rise in the average wage also requires a higher unemployment rate to 
insure effort, since the no-shirking constraints have to hold at all times. Our conjecture, then, is that both the average 
wage and unemployment will overshoot in the transition to the new steady state. Confirming this conjecture is 
beyond the scope of the present paper. 
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  2. Political Economy 
 Here we will discuss the political economy of a move from autarky to free trade in two 
parts. The main points are most easily conveyed if we consider what happens to the typical firm 
or worker at each z  and by only examining the comparative steady states. We do this for our 
central case, in which the move to free trade raises the average wage.  
 The main thrust of the political economy for comparative steady states can be understood 
through examination of Figure 3B. As before, the move from autarky to free trade divides the 
space into four key regions in terms of marginal costs. All firms with mc mcπ> , i.e. those in 
Regions I, II, and III, lose profits as a result of the move of comparative steady states from 
autarky to free trade. Only the largest firms, those with mc mcπ<  gain. Hence a move from 
autarky to free trade should be supported only by the largest firms.  
 Turning to workers, we start with several general observations. Trade always serves to 
lower the typical price and, unless unemployment rises sharply, may also raise the total (local 
and imported) number of varieties available in the market to consumers. Hence typically the 
price index will fall in the move from autarky to free trade,  which is a gain to all workers.  
 Our central case in which the selection effects of trade raise the average wage is a gain to 
workers generally. The no-shirking constraint of firms insures that workers always prefer to have 
a job than to be unemployed. Hence workers are always unhappy to learn of a job loss even 
though some of them will eventually be very happy if they happen to secure a new job with a 
sufficiently high wage. In our framework, there is always a trade-off arising from the fact that if 
indeed trade raises the average wage, it will also raise the equilibrium unemployment rate. In this 
sense, a move from autarky to free trade raises the variability of outcomes for workers – when 
employed they enjoy a higher average wage, but more of them will be unemployed.  
 There are also important distributional effects – job loss will fall particularly heavily on 
some. Since firms in Region I exit and those in Region II contract output, all workers in Region I 
firms lose their jobs and some in Region II firms lose their jobs as well. It is interesting to 
observe that although firms in Region III lose profits with the liberalization, workers there do not 
lose jobs, and so should have no reason to oppose liberalization on this basis.  
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 C. Trade Liberalization in Partially Open Economies 
 We now consider the consequences of trade liberalization in economies already partially 
open. We can again separate our discussion into the impact on the structure of the economy, 
which follows Melitz, and the scale, which requires adjustment for aggregate unemployment. 
Because the Melitz results are well known, we highlight only the novel consequences in our 
framework. In the discussion that follows we continue to assume that large firms typically pay 
higher wages.  
 The three types of liberalization in partially open economies are (1) An increase in the 
number of trading partners; (2) A reduction in variable iceberg trading costs; and (3) A reduction 
in the fixed costs of entering export markets.  
 The key analytic elements to keep track of are: (i) The shifts in margins between those 
who produce and those who exit, between those who do or don’t export; and between those 
whose profits rise with the specific liberalization and those whose profits fall; and (ii) Whether 
the liberalization raises the average wage, with consequent implications for the unemployment 
rate.  
 The three types of liberalization in partially open economies share some features. In 
particular, all three require lower marginal costs for firm survival. This forces the exit of the 
smallest firms, eliminating the jobs of workers at those firms, which we have suggested will 
typically, but not always, be lower wage jobs.  
 The liberalizations differ in their impact on the margins of which firms do or do not 
export. The increase in the number of trading partners makes it harder for the small exporter to 
continue, while the decrease in either the marginal or fixed cost of exporting makes entry into 
foreign markets easier. The logic is simple. An increase in the number of trading partners implies 
that a firm has opportunities in more markets, but with more competitors, it will have a smaller 
slice of each market. With the fixed per-market cost of export penetration unchanged, the 
initially smallest exporters will find that the new per-market demand is too small to justify the 
fixed cost of entry; they will exit the export markets, requiring lower marginal costs to survive. 
By contrast, a reduction in variable or fixed costs of trade raises demand or reduces costs 
associated with entering exporting, so leads to new exporters, i.e. to the entry of relatively high 
marginal cost exporters.  
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 Firms who cannot export even with the liberalization, or in the case of an increase in the 
number of trading partners, exit exporting, will find that their domestic market, profits, and 
employment are all eroded. The jobs lost will not typically be the economy’s highest wage jobs, 
although some of them could be relatively highly paid.  
 In the case of an increase in the number of trading partners, there will be an interval of 
surviving exporters near the marginal exporter whose profits fall even as their employment rises 
due to the larger number of fixed costs involved in servicing the new markets and the smaller 
demand per market (including the home market). Similarly, in the cases of declines in variable or 
fixed trade costs, there will be an interval of firms who newly enter the export market, whose 
employment and output rise, but whose penetration of the foreign markets is insufficient to 
compensate them for profits lost in the domestic market and the fixed costs of entering foreign 
markets.  
 In the case of an increase in the number of trading partners, the greatest gainers are the 
largest firms, who expand both employment and profits. The fixed costs of trade associated with 
entry to the new markets are of secondary importance to them, but they gain both by the access 
to new markets and by the exit of previously marginal exporters. These more than compensate 
for the loss of domestic market share. The profits of the largest firms also increase in the case of 
a decline in variable trade costs.  
 The consequences for pre-existing exporters in the case of a decline in fixed costs of 
trade are more subtle. We have examined this for a case in which productivity (inverse marginal 
costs) follows the Pareto distribution. In the case we examine, the smaller pre-existing exporters 
gain profits from the reduction in the fixed cost of trade while the largest pre-existing exporters 
lose profits.10 The intuition for this contrast is straightforward. The benefit of a reduction in the 
fixed cost of trade is constant for exporters large or small. But since lost revenues are 
proportional to initial presence in each market, the costs are considerably greater for the larger 
firms. Hence even if the decline in fixed costs benefits smaller exporters on net (as in our 
example), sufficiently large firms will find that the lost sales from new entry in all markets 
outmatches the gain from a lower fixed cost of exporting. 
                                                 
10 This provides a small corrective to Melitz (2003), p. 1718, where he claims that all pre-existing exporters lose 
both revenue and profits as a result of a decline in the fixed costs of trade. The decline in revenue is correct, but the 
decline in profits is true only for the larger pre-existing exporters.  
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 One of the important consequences of these analyses is that, unlike the case of a move 
from autarky to free trade, the output and so employment response of firms will not be 
monotonic in the size, or equivalently, marginal cost of the firm. In particular, output responses 
will typically be sharpest among firms at either the bottom of the size distribution, where they 
exit, or in the middle of the distribution, where they transit into or out of exporting. Given that 
we continue to assume that wages and size are positively correlated, the exit of the smallest firms 
generally would be expected to raise the average wage. But sharp changes in employment in the 
middle of the distribution could push either way depending on the direction of employment 
change (entering or exiting exporter status) and on whether the gains or losses are for jobs above 
or below the initial average wage. In either case, if the liberalization raises the average wage, the 
unemployment rate must rise; if it lowers the average wage, the unemployment rate will fall.  
 
VII. Conclusions 
 There is a strong public perception that trade threatens “good jobs at good wages.” Yet 
much of the international trade literature abstracts both from issues of aggregate employment and 
the attachment of workers to particular jobs. Nearly all of the literature that has addressed 
unemployment has done so in the context of inter-sectoral reallocation, although empirically the 
vast majority of re-allocation in response to liberalization occurs within sectors.  
 The recent appearance of models of firm heterogeneity in models of intra-industry trade, 
notably that of Melitz (2003), provides an opening to address these issues. In this paper, we 
merge Melitz’s model with the Shapiro-Stiglitz (1984) model of efficiency wages, amended to 
allow for firm heterogeneity in monitoring. Unemployment arises, as in Shapiro and Stiglitz, as a 
necessary condition for workers to exert effort. However, our firm based model allows us to go 
beyond Shapiro and Stiglitz to separate the effects of changes in a firm’s own wage from 
changes in the economy’s average wage on incentives to shirk, so also on unemployment. While 
a rise in an individual firm’s wage reduces incentives for shirking, a rise in the average wage 
raises incentives for shirking and in equilibrium requires a higher unemployment rate consistent 
with the supply of effort by workers. This meshes well with the Melitz results on the move from 
autarky to free trade. Here, when this liberalization raises the average wage, which we consider 
the normal case, it will also raise the unemployment rate.  
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 We also provide a coherent account of the sense in which the public perception that trade 
threatens good jobs at good wages is correct, if only partial. Framing the issue as a comparison 
between firms with common levels of technical capability ( )iϕ , a move from autarky to free 
trade indeed eliminates the highest paid jobs, causes contraction of the next highest paid jobs, 
expands relatively poorly paying jobs, and expands most sharply the lowest paying jobs. Those 
who lose high paying “good jobs” will not be pleased. However we also show that the 
productivity-normed perspective is only partial. In particular, it operates even if the net effect of 
the move from autarky to free trade is to raise the average wage. There are good reasons to 
believe this is the normal case. If the average wage rises with liberalization, as we have noted, so 
also will the unemployment rate.  
 Our ability to speak about the attachment of specific workers to specific jobs also 
provides an opportunity to fill in some elements of political economy missing from the Melitz 
model. In the original formulation, the move from autarky to free trade creates winners and 
losers among firms – only the super-exporting firms see their profits rise – but leaves all workers 
favoring liberalization. This is not an appealing model of worker perspectives on liberalization. 
In our formulation, unless unemployment rises very sharply, workers who keep their jobs will all 
experience gains via price reductions and possibly variety gains. This source of gains is also 
available to workers who lose their jobs, but for many this will be insufficient compensation for 
the loss of job-specific rents.  
 This combination of results also suggests a potential rise in the variability of outcomes 
for workers. Average wages will be expected to rise. But so will the unemployment rate. Some 
workers will lose what they perceived to be good jobs. If their initial wage was sufficiently high, 
those workers won’t be able to expect to find an equally highly paying job even if the average 
wage in the economy rose. 
 In short, this paper provides a framework that allows us to make sense of the public 
perception that trade threatens good jobs at good wages. Viewed from the proper perspective, 
this perception is perfectly correct. But it is only partial. A full view of the effects of 
liberalization also must take account of the productivity enhancements that comes from the 
equilibrium selection for relatively productive firms. This can be expected to raise the average 
wage in the economy, although it may also raise certain measures of dispersion of outcomes and 
leave at least some of those who lost jobs to trade considerably worse off.  
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Figure 1A 
Melitz-Type Model and the Autarky Entry Decision 
 
Figure 1A illustrates the first of three models of the entry decision. Generically, all three models condition 
entry to production on random draws that deliver sufficiently low marginal costs. In a Melitz-type variant 
of the model, homogeneous labor and identical monitoring costs require firms to pay a common wage 
1iw ≡  so that the only source of firm-level variation in marginal costs arises from variation in marginal 
physical productivity iϕ . Here, the decision to produce in autarky requires a productivity draw of 
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Figure 1B 
Melitz-Type Model:  
Autarky to Free Trade 
 
Figure 1B illustrates the move from autarky to free trade in our model when we suppress firm 
heterogeneity in monitoring, so again the only firm level variation in marginal costs arises, as in Melitz, 
from differences in marginal physical productivity. The consequences of this liberalization are familiar 
from Melitz. The lowest productivity firms exit; the next lowest productivity firms contract output; the 
next higher export, but are unable to maintain their autarkic profit levels; finally, only the super-exporters 
have higher profits with trade. 
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Figure 2A 
Heterogeneous Firm Shapiro-Stiglitz Model  
and the Autarky Entry Decision 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2A presents the alternative extreme to the Melitz-type approach. In it we abstract entirely from 
firm-level variation in marginal physical productivity by assuming 1iϕ ≡ . Firm level variation in 
marginal costs is thus assumed to arise here entirely due to firm level variation in wages iw . Marginal 
costs are i imc w= , where these firm-level efficiency wages reflect monitoring differences across firms. 
The minimum feasible wage is unity by choice of numéraire. Firms successfully produce only if 
*1,i aw w⎡ ⎤∈ ⎣ ⎦ .  
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Figure 2B 
How Trade Threatens “Good Jobs at Good Wages” 
 
 
Figure 2B illustrates the consequence of a move from autarky to free trade in the model in which we 
allow variation in marginal costs to arise only due to firm-level wage variation arising from firm 
differences in monitoring. It is straightforward to see that it maps the Melitz analysis precisely into this 
alternative determinant of marginal costs. This also provides the starkest articulation of public fears that 
trade destroys good jobs at good wages. All of the highest wage jobs, those with ( * *,i aw w w ⎤∈ ⎦  are 
destroyed with the liberalization. Firms that pay the next highest wages, ( *,i xw w w ⎤∈ ⎦ , have a 
contraction of employment. Firms paying the next lower set of wages, ( ,i xw w wπ ⎤∈ ⎦ , manage to 
penetrate export markets, although on net they lose profits. The firms that pay the lowest wages, (1,iw wπ ⎤∈ ⎦ , become super-exporters, have the sharpest rise in employment, and are the only firms to 
profit from this liberalization. Here trade does destroy good jobs with good wages. While shortcomings in 
this model variant motivate our hybrid model, the threat to good jobs at good wages will survive as a 
conditional prediction.   
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Figure 3A 
The General Model and the Autarky Entry Decision 
 
Figure 3A illustrates the autarky production entry decision for our core model. This core model is a 
hybrid in which marginal costs depend on firm level variation in both wages and marginal physical 
productivity. These marginal costs are given by 
1i
i
i i
wmc
zϕ≡ ≡ , represented as a ray from the origin. The 
shaded region indicates the fact that our more general model allows for draws of any technology and 
monitoring that satisfies 1iw ≥ . Along any ray, firm output, prices, revenues, wage bill, and profits are 
constant, although firm employment varies inversely with the wage. No firm pays a wage lower than the 
minimum-monitoring wage, our numeraire. The marginal entrant in autarky, with marginal cost  
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Figure 3B 
Autarky to Free Trade in the General Model 
 
 
The move from autarky to free trade changes the marginal firms from those with marginal costs *amc  to 
*mc . This leads to exit of the high marginal cost firms in Region I; contraction of the next highest 
marginal cost firms in Region II; and expansion of low marginal cost firms in Regions III and IV as they 
enter new export markets. Profits drop to zero in Region I firms and decline for firms in Regions II and 
III. The Region III firms experience the profit decline in spite of their success in exporting – the loss of 
local market share and the fixed costs of exporting are not compensated by the new profits in the foreign 
market. Only the super-exporting firms in Region IV experience higher profits. Job loss occurs wherever 
output contracts, namely in Regions I and II.   
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Figure 4 
A Conditional Threat to “Good Jobs at Good Wages” 
 
A good job may be defined as one that pays more than the average wage in autarky. For illustrative 
purposes, consider a productivity level 0ϕ  that corresponds to the point at which the average autarky 
wage curve crosses the boundary between Regions II and III. Conditional on productivity level 0ϕ , the 
highest wages on offer are at jobs in Region I firms; all of these good jobs are destroyed in the move from 
autarky to free trade. The next highest wages are on offer at jobs in Region II firms; some of these jobs 
are lost as output contracts. The Region III jobs expand, but these are bad jobs. The sharpest expansion of 
jobs occurs at the Region IV firms offering the worst jobs. These Region IV firms offering the worst jobs 
are also the only ones who increase profits in the move from autarky to free trade. Conditional on this 
productivity level, trade destroys only good jobs and expands only bad jobs. 
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Figure 5 
How Trade May Raise the Average Wage 
 
 
 
 
Low marginal cost firms are both the larger firms in autarky and also the firms that expand their output 
most rapidly with the move from autarky to free trade. If there is a positive correlation between firm size 
and firm wage, then the fact that liberalization causes the exit or contraction of small firms to the benefit 
of expanding larger firms would be expected to raise average wages. In terms of our efficiency wage 
model, this would require that more productive firms have somewhat worse monitoring technologies, but 
not so much as to fully offset the productivity advantage (hence the positive correlation of  wages and 
size). This might arise, for example, if larger firms require more teamwork, where individual effort may 
be harder to monitor.  
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